The Summa Ego-eimilogica: An Exercise in Aristotelian Virtue Ethic ‘Me-First’ Egoist Moral Theory
By Robert King
Prolegomena
From Machiavelli to Nietzsche the role of ‘Me-First’ egoistic moral decision-making has been a great benefit to societies, heterogenous in culture, yet nonetheless committed to placing the ‘Self’ as the sine qua non of all moral reflection. But, as moralist Alasdair MacIntyre (Thomistic Aristotelian) eloquently points out, at one time Virtue reigned. MacIntyre argues that although modern moral schema have devolved into a raw intuitionism (i.e. the moral theory called “emotivism”) a return to virtue will bring about a return to morality. But, contra MacIntyre, and in a more perfidious reading of Thomas Aquinas, I will argue that central to all true Virtue is a healthy appreciation of the Self! Truly, as Aquinas would argue, the self can only be known as the “rational self,” (i.e. human rationality as a participation in Divine rationality), but in a less altruistic rendering of Thomism I will propose an ethic of personal flourishing that can only be considered raw egoism—i.e. if it is “good” for me, that is, does it make me happy (eudaimonia), then I will, in fact, do such an act.
Theoretical Background
Central to Aristotelian Virtue is the Law of Nature. Whether one is studying human anatomy or the behavior of the Florida yard lizard, according to an Aristotelian account of the virtues, the Law of Nature dictates what is to be considered “ethical.” When applying the Aristotelian Mean to such Natural Law thought, the results are phenomenal rather than strictly noumenal (i.e. Kantian devaluing of Nature). Take the virtue of courage. The Florida yard lizard is a dazzling creature who, if acting with too great an amount of the virtue of courage (Aristotelian “foolhardiness!”) will dash across a street at the moment an oncoming SUV or bicycle is crossing. SPLAT! Now there is one dead, albeit heroic, yard lizard! Similar to the preceding example, the cowardly yard lizard who is about to cross the road (hypothetically to avoid the neighborly house cat about to eat it!) will, by a deficiency of the virtue of courage, turn around and flee the oncoming traffic, but only surrender its life to the feline predator!
Thus, one can see how it is neither the overly courageous, nor the cowardly who truly exhibit Aristotelian virtue. The cowardly yard lizard ends up being eaten just as surely as the foolhardy yard lizard ends up becoming road-kill. Only the truly virtuous yard lizard, the yard lizard who through superior natural selection has adapted to an urban environment will strike out in courage to cross the road, stop suddenly (the virtue of temperance might also be in effect) and then upon bobbing his or her head up and down several times to “look intimidating” to other creatures (i.e. kids on bicycles, SUV drivers, et al), will then scamper across the road at the right moment (i.e. the correspondent virtue of prudence) and make it safely to the other side. The domesticated house cat, also acting according to the Law of Nature, will similarly need to act virtuously, deciding if the size of the lizard warrants his or her pursuits (i.e. again, the virtue of prudence), and then either bravely dash out in pursuit of the yard lizard snack only after the SUV or bicycle has passed or decide foolishly (i.e. the over-abundance of courage) to pursue the lizard immediately thus similarly becoming urban road-kill.
From this brief example of how the Law of Nature dictates morality (i.e. the courageous versus the foolish or cowardly lizard) one can quickly see a healthy egoism at play. The lizard, fearing for his or her safety must in fact act egoistically. The best short and long term interests of the Florida yard lizard are safeguarded both by being a courageous lizard who neither shrinks back in fear of oncoming traffic nor plunges headlong into a Goodyear tire foolish death, but however intrinsically “virtuous” such selective yard lizard breeding may have resulted in, it is nonetheless “raw egoism” that safeguards the Florida yard lizard’s paternal and maternal DNA to be passed on to the next set of Florida yard lizard hatchlings.
Okay, this example was obviously fanciful. Short of a Jurassic Park movie, lizards are most likely neither “courageous” nor cowardly, but instead act upon instinct and raw self-preservation. The Rational Mind of the human being (nous) is what determines action so says the Modern Post-Enlightenment West, as it is owing to the influence of Kant, and the shift away from virtue and towards a strictly noumenal form of moral decision-making. But, although yard lizards do not exhibit rationality, the application of raw egoistic moral decision-making when interpreted through the Law of Nature still applies. One avoids a danger by acting neither altruistically, nor communally (contra “communitarians” such as literary theorist Stanley Fish!), but by acting selfishly! I am about to get hit by an oncoming bus, granted to no fault of my own (i.e. the bus ran a stoplight), and so sure, according to the Law of Nature which is vested in preservation of the best gene pool, I will act virtuously by pushing the elderly woman out of the way in order that neither she nor I would get hit! The moral altruist, the strictly noumenal Kantian theorist might say, but you are not respecting the Categorical Imperative! You are simply treating the elderly woman as a means, and not an end! Well, yes, according to strictly Kantian morality, I would indeed view the elderly woman as being in my way, and thus as a “means” towards extending my own life-span. According to Kant, I would simply throw myself in front of the bus, thereby saving the elderly woman who would be viewed as an “end.” But “not so,” says the Aristotelian Egoistic Moralist. Ends and means are of little use to a raw, unbridled Natural Law Egoism. In accord with good virtue, I would thus push grandma out of the way thereby saving myself first and hopefully with the net result that this older, non-biologically procreating life-form would also somehow be saved from getting hit by the bus also. Granted, similar to the Florida yard lizard example of Aristotelian moderation, if I were to act overly egoistically then this would be immoral. For example, I would throw grandma in front of the bus thereby slowing the bus’s ascent and providing a padding of time-space which would further protect my life. Yes, this would be “egoism,” but it would show an overabundance of self-interest so that although grandma might indeed slow the bus’s ascent, the concomitant skidding of the bus upon impact might result in the bus’s change in direction inadvertently hitting me in a different location (i.e. the sidewalk!). Similarly, if I were to act with too little self-interest then this too would endanger both myself and by extension the elderly woman. Acting with too little self-interest could result in either my own life ending through trying to save grandma or if I am overly concerned about grandma at strictly the emotional level (i.e. moral affectivity) then as I stand there worrying about the elderly woman the bus may either still hit her or swerve to miss the elderly woman but then crash into a light pole which then ends up shattering and spilling broken glass all over me. Therefore, rather than having an over-abundance of “self-interest” or too little “self-interest,” according to Aristotelian virtue theory (i.e. as it is grounded in the self-preserving/self-sustaining Natural Law), it is only the temperate use of Egoistic moral decision making that results in both grandma and I being saved from the oncoming bus!
Applied to Humor . . .
But what of Egoism applied to humor? Truly, humor can be “discovered” through an Aristotelian Natural Law egoism. But what about the actual use of humor, can this also be a Natural Law field of enquiry? Here, the answer can only be defined teleologically. To what “end” (i.e. telos) is humor used? The Kantian deontologist will say, “humor is to be done so that one can make a universal law.” In other words, what is “funny” to me (i.e. a Prussian Logic Professor!) must be according to rationality alone, “funny” to all people, regardless of the culture, society or historical epoch in which they live. But as anyone who has ever attempted to tell a joke in a foreign language can assure us, what is “funny” in one society, language, etc. is sometimes completely offensive in another society, language, etc. One example is while taking a photograph in Mexico I tried to make a “joke” by attempting to say, “Say cheese” in the local Spanish language. ALL of the children started smiling and giggling when I said this! But as I quickly discovered, in my attempt at humor I had accidentally spoken a word that referred to a part of a woman’s anatomy that would have been considered mildly vulgar in their dialect of Mexican Spanish. Yes, the “joke” was “funny,” but unfortunately, the “joke” was on me! Humor aside, we can now see how a strictly Kantian, deontological approach to “use of humor” will not suffice! Humor is context-dependant and linguistic to the point that Wittgenstein seems to be the only available option. But, rather than humor being relegated to somewhat philosophically vacuous “language games,” I will now propose that “humor,” that is truly funny humor can only be “humor” which is Self-serving! No, a Kantian emphasis on proper treatment of human beings as “ends” shall not suffice! Truly funny humor is that which promotes one’s own self. Yes, one can use self-deprecating humor as a form of moral egoism, but unless the self is being promoted then usually jokes are not that funny.
Yes, the overly funny person does indeed suffer from an over-abundance of humor, and yes, the person lacking in humor is often not included in many social gatherings, but in order for humor to be funny it must promote one’s own self-interests, agenda, etc. Take the example of a 2008 political cartoon of Presidential Candidate Barack Obama. Based upon Obama’s name (i.e. his father was from Kenya), and based upon a statement made by his wife, the cover of The New Yorker magazine portrays Senator Obama dressed as an Islamic militant, complete with turban, a photo of Bin Laden, wife Michelle dressed in camouflage and giving each other the “fist-tap!” As a fan of Senator Obama I found this rendering absolutely hilarious! Yes, Barack Obama is not some “secret Islamic extremist.” And no, Michelle Obama does not really hate the U.S. But what made this particular satire especially humorous was my own self-interest! I want African American Christian politicians to succeed, and although “poor taste” is the usual epithet thrown at such satires, as anyone in politics knows it is a lack of press coverage that can doom any political campaign! So, yes, “ha ha,” good one New Yorker, Obama and spouse as the next Islamic Che Guevera couple setting their sights on “liberating America” is how I interpreted your satiric front-cover! My own interests were served. Barack Obama received press coverage.
Thomistic Egoism
The use of Aristotelian virtue ethics by Thomas Aquinas is of course a much-documented course of scholarly pursuit. Whether the scholar is a conservative (i.e. legal theorist, John Finnis) or a liberal (i.e. Jean Porter of the University of Notre Dame), the core ethical teaching of Aristotle is still the norm upon which Christian theological ethical reflection is built. Here, however, the use of egoism becomes particularly problematic! If the Christian tradition is utilized then altruism, rather than self-interest is at the core of Christian moral theory. But, having noted Christianity’s positive contribution, an Egoist rendering of Thomism is nonetheless warranted, if not by Christianity, then at least by Aquinas himself. For example, in seeking to suppress heresy is it ethical to utilize the power of the secular state, to include torture? Modern morality eschews such medieval doctrinal enforcement, but not so according to the high medieval mind! If one’s kingdom is in jeopardy of losing its Christian identity then yes, according to Thomas Aquinas, force and temporal punishment is necessary to correct the heretic. Similarly, although out of line with modern European sensibilities, use of force in driving out the infidel is of course not only acceptable, but indeed lauded as was the case of the Spanish Reconquista in which Islamic Moors were driven from the Iberian peninsula, an extension of healthy Thomistic egoism ending in 1492.
Therefore, although altruism (not egoism) is at the heart of Christianity, nonetheless a healthy egoism is both warranted and applauded within a Thomistic-Arisotelian rendering of Natural Law virtue theory (i.e. Aristotle was the tutor of the Conqueror Alexander the Great who imposed virtue on much of the ancient world through sheer military force!).
Conclusion
Although Machiavellianism is to be avoided at all costs, the true egoist can be thought to be virtuous according to a robust Natural Law, Aristotelian virtue ethic. Truly, in seeking one’s self-interests, one must also seek to safeguard those self-interests (i.e. what is the point of conquering the entire world only to die in battle!). And yes, an overabundance of egoism does often result in the suppression, rather than the extension of one’s self-interests, usually not due to a problem intrinsic to egoism itself, but more due to the faulty application of egoistic moral reasoning and action. If one rushes headlong in pursuit of one’s goals, then one might miss obvious signs along the way warning the person that he or she has set their sights too low! An egoist who wants to run for political office (say Barack Obama) might have missed out on all of the lucrative book-deals that one can achieve both prior to the election, but also during Office! What might look like a time of recession to President Obama might actually be a time in which, choosing self-interest over all else, President Obama can also market his own line of “self-help” books. You Too Can Be a President could be a children’s book, and Man, Thou Art Loosed can be President Obama’s own rendition of the Bishop T.D. Jakes book. So, although egoism is to be applied, one must be careful not to act too rashly otherwise other, more lucrative self-promotion might elude the Thomistic-Aristotelian Egoist. Similarly, if one does not seek one’s self-interest enough then the result can obviously be a denial of self, rather than the self’s promotion! Only Aristotle, especially as his thought is grounded in healthy Natural Law self-preservation and self-sustainment, offers the theoretical and practice framework in which to promote self-interest at all costs, even to the point of greater self-interest through elucidating further areas of self-promotion.
WESLEYAN CATHOLICISM?: RECOVERING SAINTHOOD AS NORMATIVE LOCUS OF THEOLOGICAL TRUTH AND IDENTITY
By Robert King
Faculty (Philosophy), University of Phoenix
“Christ’s call is to feed the hungry, not the full; to save the lost, not the stiff-necked; not to call scoffers, but sinners to repentance; not to build and furnish comfortable chapels, churches, and cathedrals at home in which to rock Christian professors to sleep by means of clever essays, stereotyped prayers and artistic musical performances, but to raise living souls among the destitute, to capture men from the devil’s clutches and snatch them from the very jaws of hell, to enlist and train them for Jesus, and make them into an Almighty Army of God.”
--C.T. Studd (1858 – 1931), missionary to China & Africa
Introduction:
In the opening editorial of the 2003 November issue of Inside the Vatican, editor Robert Moynihan offers a brief, yet striking commentary upon appraisals of Pope John Paul II’s legacy as head of the Catholic Church. Although slightly dated, the appraisals critiqued by Moynihan still have strong resonance within the Catholic Church now under the shepherding of Pope Benedict XVI.
In seeking to counter critiques of Pope John Paul II, rather than directly countering such claims, Moynihan instead critiques the very criteria by which such negative evaluations are even made. Citing Bernard of Clairvaux, Moynihan argues simply that the reason that many do not understand the real meaning of John Paul II’s pontificate is simply because those who critique the Pope lack the holiness of life necessary to even make such evaluations. According to both Bernard and Moynihan, true understanding of the mystery of God’s will is achieved “not in disputation, but in sanctity.” Or as Bernard of Clairvaux writes, “If you are a saint, you have comprehended and you know. If you are not, be one and you will know by your experience. Holy affection makes a saint, and this affection is two-fold: holy fear and holy love.”
Only the saints truly understand the deep mysteries of the LORD. Throughout much of Christian history, such an appeal to sanctity of life as key criterion of theological knowledge has been a recurring, if often overlooked theme. Beginning with Jesus Christ Himself, the calling to strict holiness of life was part and parcel of the New Law that fulfilled the Old Mosaic Law. As Jesus states boldly in the Sermon on the Mount, “Think not that I have come to abolish the law and the prophets; I have come not to abolish them, but to fulfill them” and that “whoever then relaxes one of the least of these commandments and teaches men so, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven; but he who does them and teaches them shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven.” According to Jesus, the path of holiness is the path of salvation itself, and thus no theological knowledge apart from growth in holiness would be warranted on the ground of any form of epistemological superiority apart from holiness.
Stemming from the example of Jesus Himself, and most of New Testament teaching, the primacy of holiness for even beginning knowledge of the deep mysteries of Jesus Christ has been a perennial concern, and one especially important for Wesleyan and Catholic Christians at the beginning of a new millennium already marked with a seemingly endless litany of “wars and rumors of wars.” Thus, in response to the three-fold concerns of ecumenical theology, ecclesial reform and reading the “signs of the times,” this paper shall attempt to discern and then forge a common thread of holinessas key criterion to theological reflection, especially in the overlap between evangelical Wesleyanism and traditional Catholicism. In order to attempt this task, I will offer a brief reading of two historically disparate ecclesial reformers (i.e. John Wesley and Pope John Paul II) who in a strikingly similar fashion have portrayed growth in holiness of life (personal and corporate) as an inseparable criterion for any attempted speculative theology. The texts that shall be considered as paradigmatic for each figure are: John Wesley’s sermons “The Image of God (1730); “Christian Perfection” (1741) and “Catholic Spirit” (1750) and Pope John Paul II’s Veritatis Splendor (concerning moral theology as a discipline) and Ut Unum Sint (concerning contemporary Catholic ecumenism). Hopefully, through such exposition, juxtaposition and comparison, it will become readily apparent, not only how similar evangelical Wesleyanism and traditional Catholicism are concerning the question of theological epistemology (i.e. holiness itself as primary criterion for revealed truth), but more importantly can also point towards the potential normativity of growth in holiness in order to even engage in any form of speculative theology, especially as it is rooted in the sanctifying and illuminating activity of the Holy Spirit.
Restoring the Fallen “Image of God”: A Reading of Three Sermons by John Wesley
In an early sermon (1730) by John Wesley entitled “The Image of God,” Wesley offers a reading of theological anthropology and epistemology that in many ways can be considered foundational for any attempted synthetic representation concerning Wesleyan holiness as key criterion for theological reflection. This is especially the case given Wesley’s well-known reliance upon the Early Eastern Fathers whose eikon theology provided a Western iconic theological anthropology through Wesley. Concerning “The Image of God,” a theological exegesis of Genesis 1:27, Wesley focuses specifically on how the Fall from original Grace distorted the Image of God in primarily four areas: 1) human knowledge; 2) human will; 3) human liberty; 4) human happiness.
First, concerning human knowledge, Wesley notes how because humanity has abused its liberty and rebelled against its Creator, the originally perfected human capacity for knowledge has been damaged. Concerning the original perfect human knowledge, Wesley writes, “He [original humanity/”Adam”] was endued, after the likeness of His Maker, with a power of distinguishing truth from falsehood, either by a simple view wherein he made the nearest approach to that all-seeing Nature, or by comparing one thing with another(a manner of knowledge perhaps peculiar to himself) and often inferring farther truths from the these proceeding comparison . . . He was equally a stranger to error and doubt, either he saw not at all, or he saw plainly.” Following the Fall of humanity, however, such original perfect knowledge has been stained. Wesley writes, “It [the intellect] mistook falsehood for truth, and truth for falsehood.” Additionally, Wesley notes that the human mind suffered not only loss of clarity, but loss of rapidity saying, “With its clearness went its swiftness too; confusion and slowness came together. Instead of being able to find out the natures of ten thousand creatures almost in a moment, it became unable to trace out fully the nature of any one in many years.”
Second, just as the human mind was corrupted by the Fall, so also was the will. Although also created in original perfection, such a perfect will was then replaced by the depths of human sin. Wesley writes, “Instead of the glorious one [will] that possessed it whole before, it was now seized by legions of vile affections. Grief and anger and hatred and fear and shame, at once rushed in upon it, the whole train of earthly, sensual, and devilish passions fastened on, and tore it in pieces. Nay, love itself, that ray of the Godhead, that balm of life, now became a torment.”
Third, concerning human liberty, whereas perfect freedom existed prior to the Fall from Grace, because of the Fall and its effects, human beings became enslaved, including the enslavement of the human mind itself. Wesley writes, “Indeed what else could the human mind do when it had no freedom left? Liberty went away with virtue; instead of an indulgent master it was under a merciless tyrant. The subject of virtue became the slave of vice.”
Fourth, although humanity was created with happiness, this also has been lost through the Fall from Grace. Wesley writes, “The consequence of his being enslaved to a depraved understanding and a corrupted will could be no other than the reverse of that happiness which flowed from them in their perfection.” Finally, Wesley concludes his sermon by offering the antidote to fallen humanity. In the face of the Fall from Grace and its effects, Jesus Christ offered Himself as a Ransom Sacrifice freeing humanity from the Law of sin and death, thus restoring redeemed humanity “first to knowledge, and then to virtue, and freedom, and happiness.”
In examining this early sermon of Wesley, for the purposes of this paper, the key emphasis will be simply on how for Wesley, the Fall from Grace has tarnished the Image of God so that the human intellect and will on its own merits cannot attain true knowledge of divine things. Indeed, although in many ways Wesley provides a positive appreciation of human co-operation with divine grace (opposed to Calvinist strict utter depravity), for the purposes of this paper, it must be noted that for Wesley, as the intellect itself is left unaided by Divine Grace so also would any theological leadership be potentially corrupted. In that the will is also effected by the Fall from Grace, the human mind even when guided by Grace, must still be continually grounded in a will that is similarly grounded in Grace.
In order to expand a reading of Wesley’s theological epistemology the 1741 sermon “Christian Perfection” will now be examined. The ways in which human beings are not perfect in Divine Knowledge are the mystery of the Triune God-head, precise times and seasons, knowledge of when the parousia will occur, and finally knowledge concerning what is essential for salvation.
Following a further explication of how human imperfection is also evidenced in ongoing fleshly temptation, Wesley specifically links Christian perfection to holiness. Specifically, throughout the remainder of the sermon, Wesley seeks to demonstrate not only that Christian perfection is a true possibility in this eartly life, but that such freedom from sin is the normative Christian calling. Wesley writes, “”Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.” (an insight from John 5:18) Another example that not only affirms a “complete sanctificationist” reading of Wesley, but also parallels an argument made by Pope John Paul II concerning the problem of proportionalism in contemporary Catholic moral theology is when Wesley writes, “Least of all can you with any colour of argument infer that any man must commit sin at all. No; God forbid we should thus speak. No necessity of sin was laid on them [the apostles].”
In examining Wesley’s sermon, “On Christian Perfection,” several observations are warranted. First, Wesley’s view of the Fall from Grace affecting the human intellect would necessitate an account of Divine Grace in order to restore such fallen human intellect. Second, the normative Wesleyan vision of sanctification is one in which Christian perfection results in a complete freedom from sin (the total sanctificationist view). Third, since Wesley includes themes of corrupted human intellect and will still affecting redeemed Christians in this life and also a true Christian Perfection possible in this life, holiness is the end goal of this earthly existence, and without such holiness, the intellect and will remain in a state of partial corruption even following initial justification.
Having noted the restoration of the Imago Dei as key to Wesley’s theological epistemology, the final question concerning Wesley at this point is to what extent such sanctified knowledge was possible outside of Wesley’s specific ecclesial allegiances. Although many possible references can be made to Wesley’s specific statements regarding Roman Catholicism, given the historical contextual factors surrounding Wesley’s anti-papist polemics, the most positive place of Wesley’s thought concerning Roman Catholicism can be found in Wesley’s 1750 sermon “Catholic Spirit.”
At the opening of this sermon, Wesley makes an appeal to the primacy of love—love of God, love of neighbor and love of enemy. Although Christians can disagree on matters of polity and worship, Wesley exhorts his hearers to maintain a unity of heart, a unity of love, and a unity of prayer.
From this brief examination of Wesley’s ecumenism, the focus of Wesleyan ecumenical theology should thus be similarly focused—unity of love, unity of heart and unity of prayer—three forms of unity especially highlighted by Pope John Paul in Ut Unum Sint.
“Be Not Conformed to this World”: Holiness as Key Criterion of Theological Knowledge (Epistemology)
In his watershed 1993 papal encyclical Veritatis Splendor, Pope John Paul II not only sets out to correct abuses within modern Catholic moral theology, but also provides a glimpse into his approach to ecumenism.
First, personal encounter with Jesus Christ is made the center of all moral enquiry. Second, the fulfillment of the Law can only come as a gift from God. Third a close connection is established between eternal life and obedience to God’s commandments. Fourth, Christian perfection (especially as an invitation to perfect love of God and neighbor) is a universal calling, that rather than limiting human freedom, instead represents the “maturity in self-giving to which human freedom is called.” Finally, Jesus Christ is further established as the primordial foundation of Christian morality, through His very Personhood, through imitation of His example, and through conforming to Christ through the grace and active presence of the Holy Spirit.
From such an exegetical foundation as rooted in Personal encounter with Jesus Christ, in the next chapter entitled, “Do not be conformed to this world,” (Romans 12:2), Pope John Paul II then begins to call into question many of the more specific presuppositions undergirding disturbing trends in Catholic moral theology. John Paul II rightly questions such modern Western tendencies including: the absolutization of personal freedom (e.g. false elevation of the conscience over Church teaching); modern scientific behavioralist rejections of freedom; a lessening dependence of freedom on truth; the autonomy of reason; separating an ethical order from the order of salvation; pitting human freedom against biological nature; and a misappropriation of teleology as a form of “consequentialism” used to justify particular unethical (or even intrinsically evil!) acts such as abortion or euthanasia.
Finally, in chapter three of the encyclical entitled “Lest the Cross of Christ Be Emptied of Its Power (1 Corinthians 1:17), Pope John Paul II counters such presuppositions through a Christ-centered, soteriologically-focused calling to personal growth in holiness as a conforming to Jesus Christ Himself. In Jesus, perfect freedom can be found as a total obedience to the will of God, especially as demonstrated in the crucifixion. Thus, although potentially foolish in the eyes of the world, “consequentialist” or “proportionalist” ethical theories that seek to justify wrongful acts through appealing to the supposed good that may come from them, are instead rendered unacceptable given the possibility of and calling to Christian martyrdom, rather than committing an act that is contrary to either natural or revealed law.
Although the calling to Christian holiness, potentially even martyrdom, is a logical emphasis of Veritatis Splendor (in that moral theology is its specific polemical context), such a unievsral calling to holiness is alsoa key criterion to theological reflection within John Paul II’s ecumenical theology. In the 1995 encyclical Ut Unum Sint, John Paul II makes the cross of Jesus Christ explicitly central for all Christian ecumenism in how the cross signifies the common martyrology shared by all Christian martyrs in that their martyrdom is a physical union with the crucifixion of Jesus Christ.
From the shared martyrdom of Jesus Christ and Protestant, Catholic and Orthodox martyrs flows a holiness that unites all Christian bodies. Within the shared crucifixion of Jesus Christ also obviously stands salvation, with specific conversion to Jesus Christ a necessary prerequisite for ecumenical theology. Extending from the martyrdom of Jesus and Christian martyrs, several other commonalities between Wesley and John Paul II can be noted regarding ecumenical theology. First, similar to Wesley’s predilection for pre-Nicene apostolic Christian faith and practice, John Paul II appeals to the primacy of Apostolic Tradition as both source for reform and ecumenism. Second, following in the footsteps of Pope John XXIII (and arguably those of John Wesley!), renewal of the Catholic Church must not be separated from ecumenical openness. Third, although ecumenism must be fostered, reconciliation must not come at the expense of truth, or done in any spirit of false irenicism or indifference to Church ordinances. Fourth, although the celebration of the Eucharist remains the place where division is still most sharply felt, similar to Wesley, Pope John Paul II enumerates areas where true communion can exist—namely common prayer and shared love and affection. As John Paul II writes concerning the unifying aspects of common prayer, “If Christians, despite their divisions, can grow ever more united in common prayer around Christ, they will grow in the awareness of how little divides them in comparison to what unites them.”
Given both the extensive similarities between Eastern Orthodoxy and Catholicism, Pope John Paul II gives greatest particular attention to ecumenism with these Churches, before turning towards ecumenical relations with fellow Christians of the West. Concerning the latter, John Paul II emphasizes the shared sacramental bond of baptism done in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. Also, the centrality of Jesus Christ as Lord, God and sole Mediator between God and humanity is again affirmed. Additionally, although the Gospel itself may be understood differently by non-Catholics, in the areas of ethics and morality, John Paul II affirms both the urgency for such collaboration, as well as further room for dialogue.
Finally, although John Paul II concludes with the primacy of the Bishop of Rome as the historic continuation of Peter’s apostolic office and thus “sentinel” for all of Christianity, it is through the primary criterion of holiness that ecumenism can forge ahead. Specifically, through each Christian cultivating their “interior spiritual space” in Jesus Christ, by the Power of the Holy Spirit, each Christian can then be led to whether or not they have been faithful to Chris’s plan for the Church. Additionally, such a common heritage of holiness already exists, especially through a common Martyrology and the common communion of saints. John Paul II writes, “the communion between our Communities, even if still incomplete, is truly and solidly grounded in the full communion of the saints—those who at the end of a life faithful to grace, are in communion with Christ in glory. These saints come from all the Churches and Ecclesial Communities which gave them entrance into the communion of salvation.” In other words, not a common heritage simply based in institutions, rites and traditions, but “first and foremost this reality of holiness.”
Conclusion: Wesleyan Catholicism, Church of the Future?
Through briefly examining the sermons of John Wesley on the “Image of God,” “Christian Perfection,” and “Catholic Spirit,” and the encyclicals of Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor and Ut Unum Sint, one can immediately recognize a shared “catholic spirit” permeating the writings of both men, in short, the Holy Spirit who unites the Christian Churches. In particular, through strikingly similar emphases on prayer, Christian love and personal sanctification leading to Christian perfection, the Catholic Visions of both men are highly similar. Additionally, by grounding theological knowledge (epistemology) itself in Christian sanctification—i.e. Wesley’s emphasis on the restoration of the Fallen Imago Dei and Pope John Paul II locating both moral and ecumenical theology under the normative vision of holiness as rooted in the martyrs of Christendom—both men offer a strikingly similar theological epistemology.
Finally, both John Wesley and Pope John Paul II, through pointing to holiness of Christian lives (i.e. saints) as normative criterion for theological reflection, thus also provide a rich vision for how the entire Body of Jesus Christ might proceed in the coming millennium, in short a new wineskin of Spirit-Empowered “Wesleyan Catholicism.”
(Article submitted to Academic Questions, a Journal of the National Association of Scholars)
Whose Meta-Narrative, Which Relativism?: Intellectual Jihad and the Un-masking of Liberalism
by Robert King
The other day I posted a "blog" on a political adversary's blog-site. I posted the “blog” in response to a heated exchange on the new Wikia Campaigns e-mail list. Although he is an unknown outside the world of "techies," this list serve had been created by the ‘one and only’ Jim "Jimbo" Wales, inventor of Wiki-pedia, the free on-line encyclopedia. At the heart of the debate was what constitutes "free speech," what constitutes "spam" and what criteria would be utilized in making such decisions. This on-line interlocutor (a law student at Columbia University and undergrad alum of Duke ironically enough) essentially wanted to silence me in this forum due to my Pro-Life political commitments. My response to his “Nazi-spam request” was “Sir, If protecting the lives of babies is wasted time then I will pray for you.” Based upon this response, I received numerous follow-up e-mails and ended up being listed in his personal blog, with a surprising commentary by many of his own friends saying that he was trying to silence me because he simply disagreed with my political views.
Although the further details of this exchange are logged forever in the computer banks of Wikipedia, the conceptual argument (something missed by most respondents, including the Columbia law student!) was nevertheless completely overlooked. Mud-slinging abounded, but the heart of the conceptual discussion only three respondents seemed to even have a clue of what was being argued! In many ways, the exchange epitomized what Alasdair MacIntyre described in After Virtue, a type of confused moral discourse in which various moral and political terminology was being utilized, and much on-line ink was being spilled, but by and large the conversation partners were speaking past each other conceptually. The primary problem with the entire discussion was that it is was marked by an incommensurability of moral terminology and at times a creeping form of emotivism in which the truth or falsehood of any respective view was based solely on a cloaked meritocracy of on-line insider knowledge (i.e. the Wikipedia "good ole boys club"), rather than any type of serious engagement of the premises (stated and unstated) of a counter-posed argument. Well as a gate-crasher (the civilized Greek crashing the Gates of the Barbarians!), all I could do was put on my best Stanley Hauerwas epistemological gun-slinging tie and blue jeans and get to work deconstructing (provocatively if necessary) the incoherence and raw will-to-power of my interlocutor.
First I began with Michel Foucault, a darling of Liberalism (he was after all a practicing homosexual) who was used as a subversive attempt to pull intellectual insurrection among the Liberal camp by pointing to the supposed ‘objectivity’ of knowledge as often being a thinly clad will-to-power propped up by state-run institutions such as the modern prison system. Next, I threw at them Alasdair MacIntyre, the former Scottish Marxist turned Aristotelian, who was used to drop philosophical “smart bombs” on many remaining Liberal bunkers by conceptually asking the question of sociology of knowledge, even to the point of enquiring about the professional and academic qualifications that were supporting their blanket dismissal of highly nuanced philosophical arguments. Of course, any religious speech on my part was jettisoned by the on-line liberals as being "extremist.” To the Liberal camp, some of whom were even Christian Liberals, all that I was doing was a jihad intellectually. Their response to me, the supposed intellectual jihadist was, “ban all Pro-Life speech from Political Forums!” “Put on the spam filter!” “Move the discussion to a different web-blog!” Whereas one could advocate even starting a new Technological Party in Campaigns Wikia (a.k.a. “the Green Party with I-Pods!”), if one raises even an on-line eyebrow concerning the marginalizing of Pro-life politics (in short, the Republican Party's majority!) then suddenly I was viewed as Osama with a rosary!
Although I am, in fact, engaged in the culture wars (as an on-line professor and military chaplain), “intellectual jihad” is not the correct category for such cultural warfare. Rather than "destroying Liberals" (the jihadist approach), simply unmasking Liberal hypocrisy is the goal of this paper. Like Foucault, himself a Liberal post-modernist, astutely pointed out, Liberalism, on its own terms, usually degenerates into hypocrisy and at times raw police force. If one cannot silence the Pro-Life movement intellectually, then make it a crime to peacefully assemble in protest. If one cannot understand an on-line interlocutor's argument, then simply pull the "good ole boy" dirty hand of screaming for spam filters. In that setting, hypocrisy was successfully unmasked. Even the young Columbia law student’s friends “blogged” on about how he was trying to silence me—victory for classical thought.
Whose Meta-Narrative, Which Relativism?
Unlike the post-modern era, the classical era in Western civilization (Fifth Century B.C. – Fifth Century A.D.) has been adopted (co-opted even!) by Jew, Christian and pagan alike. Why is this so? Why did early Christian theologians such as Augustine in the West and Gregory of Nyssa in the East, two thinkers trained in the philosophical paideia of the time, essentially fuse neo-Platonism and Biblical Christian belief? In the contemporary scene, why do Christian and Private Secular Educationists alike herald the value of a “Great Books” curriculum in which Plato, Aristotle, et al are studied? One answer is that the classical era, unlike modern relativism degenerating into post-modernism, provides for and in fact is built upon meta-narrative. For Plato to think that his thought was not universally applicable (i.e. a type of “meta-narrative”), but rather only “true for him” or “true for Athens” (i.e. relativism) would be completely alien to Plato. For example, In positing the “ideal Republic” or the “ideal of justice,” Plato sought after a universal standard, and a universal standard as set within an overarching universal cosmology and epistemology, in short, a coherent universally applicable meta-narrative. Granted the term “meta-narrative” itself implies a deviation from classical thought in that something “other-than-meta-narrative” can even be conceptualized, but having crossed the Rubicon of Post-Modernism, meta-narrative must now be the category de jeur that Christian, Jew and pagan alike must now seek to recapture.
Now that we are agreed that any attempted retrieval of classical thought, in order to be true to the texts themselves (texts qua texts, a methodology difficult for post-modern literary critics, for example Stanley Fish who views textual meaning as inextricably narrative community-dependent) must also, of course, be an exercise in meta-narrative. Normative reality is the conceptual framework (epistemological and cosmological) of Classical Thought, but the question would still remain, whose meta-narrative would one use? The Christian meta-narrative is the one and only true meta-narrative, and to think otherwise would be to go against the heart of Christian thought as Christian Belief is grounded in the Eternal and Incarnate LOGOS (John 1:1-18). All reality is breathed forth by the Spirit working in creation (Genesis 1), the ruach elohim, and as breathed forth by the Spirit the LOGOS is embedded in all of creation, if not in essence (the pantheist heresy), then in LOGIC. As Thomas Aquinas would later clarify, Divine Rationality is the source and mirror of all human rationality, and therefore the LOGOS is itself the LOGIC of all creation. Thus, to the Christian, meta-narrative should be an issue that has already been solved. The LOGOS is the meta-narrative, not just for Christians, but for the entire cosmos. “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. All things came into being through Him, and without Him not one thing came into being.” (John 1:1-3) The Christian worldview is one which by its very own self-authenticating criterion of epistemological authority (i.e. the LOGOS as Divine Rationality) can never be a form of relativism or post-modernism to the extent that such canonical aspects of Christian belief would therefore be jettisoned. No, to be Christian is to not be a relativist, nor a post-modernist.
Having noted the epistemological superiority of the Christian worldview as the universal meta-narrative that not only transcends but is instantiated in world culture(s), given that Christianity still only represents 1/3 of the world population, the question of competing meta-narratives still presents itself. Whose meta-narrative should Higher Education (or Governmental structures) be based upon? Should simple majority rule determine whether or not institutions are rooted in the Christian meta-narrative? If majority rule is cited, would the “minority perspective” (e.g. Buddhism, Islam, Wicca, scientology, secular humanism) also be included in order to create a practical “hodge-podge of viewpoints?” If competing meta-narratives are “fused” (perhaps in Hegelian fashion!), would the end result still be anyone’s meta-narrative? Truly within Christianity, such a fusion of rival traditions of enquiry can result in a fruitful re-conceptualizing of Christian Belief, for example as Alasdair MacIntyre argues is the case for Augustinian Platonism and a rediscovered medieval Aristotelianism resulting in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. But is such a fusion of rival traditions even possible outside of the Christian Meta-Narrative? One could posit a LOGOS-based fusion of Christian Belief and other intellectual and/or religious traditions as somehow being grounded in creation—i.e. all grounded in the LOGOS as embedded in nature—but in so doing, the resulting meta-narrative would still be Christian.
Therefore, in conclusion, and in agreement with the radical orthodox camp (e.g. John Milbank of the University of Virginia; Stanley Hauerwas of Duke), there is no other option than the Christian meta-narrative. Truly, one can disagree with part or the whole of Christian belief (unbelief is always an option), but according to its own terms, Christian meta-narrative would have to be everyone’s meta-narrative. Within this meta-narrative of Christian Belief, surely practice plays a constituency-defining role (the point made by virtue ethicists such as MacIntyre, Hauerwas, et al). Also, within this Christian meta-narrative, other worldviews (philosophical and religious) can be incorporated. For example, Platonic thought was easily adopted by Christian theologians of the first seven centuries and Aristotelian categories similarly co-opted by Aquinas and the medieval scholasticism that ensued. Also, other religions can find expression (in part) in orthodox Christian belief and practice, without degenerating into syncretism (e.g. a proto-Trinitarian belief expressed by indigenous pre-Christian religion in the Philippines). Thus, both philosophy and world religion can be contained within the Christian meta-narrative, but only to the extent that such thought and practice is in conformity with the Divine LOGOS who is Jesus Christ, the Incarnate WORD. Therefore, although the Christian meta-narrative is indeed the only meta-narrative, the final question is which relativism would one be speaking of in such queries as I found in my on-line political battle on Wikia Campaigns? The ordinary, fallacious relativism, is of course ver boten. What is “true for a community” or “true for an individual” is either true or false universally. There is no middle ground. Having discarded the fallacious form of relativism (the kind of relativistic thinking that clouds the minds of much Western Higher Education), a “provisional relativism” is nonetheless both allowable and warranted. Here, the Orthodox theological sharp division between “apophatic theology” (knowledge that is a mystery) and “kataphatic theology” (knowledge that can be known, either revealed or through natural means) is a helpful addition to the current conversation concerning the present incoherence of the modern, and post-modern Western university system. Granted, this form of “provisional relativism” would still be under the Christian Meta-Narrative, but through emphasizing what would be considered a mystery (both theologically and of the cosmos), a certain type of “relativism” would be and in fact should be affirmed in that no single culture has a stranglehold on the “ONE TRUTH.” If only my on-line interlocutor could see either the need to affirm an overarching meta-narrative or the consequent need to affirm a type of apophatic Christian relativism that could encompass all of the world’s cultures within the Mystery of Salvation.